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The anti-trafficking industry in the Gulf

November 12, 2026

8 min read
A group of people in a training
A group of people in a training
The presence of UN agencies in Gulf anti-trafficking efforts lends them credence, but there is little evidence these efforts have improved the situation on the ground. Image courtesy: https://bahrain.un.org

The official Gulf response to accusations of trafficking on its soil was, for years, defensive skepticism. Over time, that changed. Gulf governments seem to have accepted that trafficking could be a reality at home, and consequently, become interested in showing that they are taking it seriously. This shift has produced what appears to be a performative anti-trafficking industry in the Gulf: a network of institutions that conduct training workshops, organise conferences, distribute awards, sign partnerships and share social media posts that regurgitate excerpts of anti-trafficking laws, primarily aimed at demonstrating a commitment to combating human trafficking rather than confronting the kafala system that enables it.  

While several Gulf countries have introduced - Opens in new tab labour reforms in recent years — including easing restrictions on job mobility and exit permits — these changes have been partial, weakly enforced, and often exclude domestic workers altogether. Such reforms shift modes of control but leave the power imbalance in employers’ favour. 

International organisations have become key players in this industry. UN agencies, mainly the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which has no independent standards or binding covenants, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), have built significant partnerships across the Gulf: training frontline workers, co-designing national referral mechanisms, and launching capacity-building projects with government counterparts. These partnerships are typically framed as technical assistance in the service of international standards or best practices. But they also happen to be exactly the kind of assistance Gulf governments want: security- and process-oriented, built around identifying and processing individual ‘victims’ rather than dismantling the kafala system, which produces vulnerability at scale. In exchange, the UN agencies get something they need too  — access to governments that might otherwise shut them out, funding for their own projects and organisations, and a steady stream of favourable press about landmark partnerships or milestones.

In 2019, Bahrain's Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA) - Opens in new tablaunched - Opens in new tab a Regional Centre for Training and Capacity Building to Combat Human Trafficking. The centre runs - Opens in new tabworkshops - Opens in new tab for participants from Bahrain and across the region, with attendees from various backgrounds, including labour inspectors, judges, airline staff, and hotline operators. By 2025, the centre had certified dozens of trainers and - Opens in new tablaunched - Opens in new tab a ‘Best Practices Award’ for private companies, including Talabat - Opens in new tab, a food-delivery company that has a record of labour exploitation - Opens in new tab. The centre also signed a second-phase agreement with the IOM running through 2028. Bahrain has in 2026 held a Tier 1 ranking - Opens in new tab in the US State Department's Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP report) for nine consecutive years, and its government - Opens in new tabcites - Opens in new tab the centre as evidence of that standing. 

Neither the Bahraini government nor the TIP report have shown that the centre itself has produced a stronger understanding of trafficking among Bahraini participants who trained in it, that the training workshops have led to a significant improvement in combating trafficking in the country, or that prosecutions of trafficking cases in the country have increased. The centre's main role seems to be to issue certificates, hold workshops, and hand out awards. None of its work is contingent on whether the number of victims actually found and referred goes up, nor on the quality of support provided to them. It substitutes training for the harder, costlier work of dismantling kafala and the abusive laws built around it. 

In Kuwait, the shelter operated by the Public Authority for Manpower, opened in 2014 with capacity to accommodate up to 500 women domestic workers, has become a regular destination for US ambassadors, particularly around the International Day Against Trafficking in Persons. The visits have followed a remarkably similar pattern. In 2016, the US ambassador described the shelter as an exceptional facility in the Middle East and praised Kuwait for its efforts to support workers who had encountered abuse. In 2018, a different US ambassador toured the shelter and praised Kuwait's efforts to improve the living conditions of migrant workers. In 2021, the new US ambassador and five other foreign ambassadors visited the shelter, with the US ambassador describing its efforts to accommodate workers in need of assistance as "great." In 2024, another US ambassador praised the shelter for providing its residents with social and psychological protection and dignified accommodation. Year after year, these visits and statements have helped turn the shelter into a symbol of Kuwait's commitment to combating trafficking, with foreign diplomats, mainly US ambassadors, knowingly or not, providing an important layer of legitimacy to that claim. 

The shelter itself is important. Victims of trafficking and other workers facing abuse need somewhere safe to go. But a shelter should be a last resort, not the measure of whether a country is preventing trafficking or protecting workers. There is little publicly available evidence that the shelter has functioned primarily as a mechanism for identifying trafficking cases, referring them to authorities, or triggering investigations into trafficking. The repeated diplomatic tours rarely prompt questions about why workers need the shelter in the first place. None of the US ambassadors who visited the shelter condemned the kafala system or the country’s legal restrictions on changing employers, nor other factors that created the need for the shelter. Instead, the shelter is presented as evidence of Kuwait's exceptional response to trafficking, while the very system that drives workers into the shelter itself remains largely outside the story. 

The mechanism is not limited to state bodies. The Riyadh-based non-profit Ibtissam (‘Smile’) seems to perform a similar function. The organisation's own reporting - Opens in new tab provides little insight into its work or impact. Although ‘providing care to trafficking victims’ is listed among Ibtissam's strategic objectives, its 2024 and 2025 annual reports do not disclose how many trafficking victims it provided care for. Between 2023 and 2025, Ibtissam spent - Opens in new tab approximately SAR 1.66 million (USD 442,600), with the overwhelming majority allocated to salaries, office rent, insurance, and other administrative expenses. In 2025, the organisation's most tangible publicly reported - Opens in new tab activity was a single online seminar held in July to mark the World Day Against Trafficking in Persons, attended by approximately 130 participants and promoted with UN certificate branding. In 2026, Ibtissam organised another webinar - Opens in new tab on Saudi National Day and conducted - Opens in new tab training for some of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development (MHRSD) staff.  

Underlying this bureaucratic approach to trafficking is the NGO’s conceptualisation of the issue. In an interview with Al-Yamama magazine in 2020, its chair, Princess Dr Madawi bint Abdulrahman Al Saud, stated that trafficking is "easier and more widespread in the Western world" because of its "fragile systems", while the Arab world benefits from "established and very solid systems" that "dry up the sources of the crime." Consequently, she claimed, “our country's trafficking caseload is much lower than the Western average." Notably absent from the interview was any discussion of kafala, domestic workers, or forced labour issues in the Saudi labour market. Princess Madawi received the ‘Global Ambassador Award’ from the US-based NOMI Network in the same year.  

To be sure, Ibtissam and the broader Saudi nonprofit ecosystem are relatively new, and it may be premature to judge their long-term impact. Ibtissam posted a job vacancy for a ‘programme and project specialist’, which may suggest it plans to expand its operations and conduct more activities in the future. Nevertheless, Ibtissam illustrates another feature of the anti-trafficking industry: organisations adopting the language of victim protection while producing little evidence of doing so.  

The problem is not that these institutions and efforts accomplish nothing. It is that their success is measured almost entirely by processes rather than outcomes. Workshops replace access to justice, partnerships replace victim protection, and ceremonies and photoshoots substitute for dismantling the legal structures that continuously generate forced labour and trafficking. It is an industry that keeps performing but rarely serves the people it claims to help.  

MRRORS reached out to Ibtissam for comment but has not received a response at the date of publication.

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